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PROVOCATION 
LAW’S REPUBLICS 
Vlad Perju∗ 
I begin with three premises: First, the relevance for any polity of 
the exercises in self-government of other political communities, as en-
coded in their constitutional laws and cultures, is not self evident and 
must therefore be justified.  Second, that justification must place do-
mestic and foreign law within a unitary framework by reference to 
which the comparativist’s choices can be defended.  Third, no project 
of comparative constitutional law, and perhaps comparative law gen-
erally, can withstand scrutiny unless it articulates, or it signs on to 
some articulation, of such a framework.  By placing comparative con-
stitutional law within the larger constitutional democratic project of 
government by law, Professor Frank Michelman’s work gives us a 
framework for how the constitutional mind can approach — or “go 
visiting,”1 as Hannah Arendt put it — the experiments in collective 
self-determination of other free communities of equals.  My Provoca-
tion explores that framework.  It finds in it a model for one possible 
future of comparative constitutional law, a future that, at least in the 
view of this grateful student, is far more appealing than all others. 
I.  THE CHALLENGES OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 
The experience of approaching a plurality of constitutional systems 
is like observing the vast constitutional sky through a magnifying 
glass.  How to construct a lens that shows the details of constitutional 
doctrine without obscuring the larger constitutional architecture of col-
lective self-determination?  The task of mastering any one system 
seems daunting enough.  How, then, to think about law’s republics — 
in the plural?2 
Consider some of the most urgent challenges.  Comparison by defi-
nition involves looking at more than one jurisdiction.  But how to 
choose where to look, what jurisdictions to compare (why this and not 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 * Associate Professor, Boston College Law School.  This “provocation” is a revised version of 
a paper that was presented at the Symposium in Honor of Professor Frank Michelman, hosted by 
Harvard Law School on February 10–11, 2012. 
 1 HANNAH ARENDT, LECTURES ON KANT’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 43 (Ronald Beiner 
ed., 1989).  
 2 Of course, with this formulation I wish to call to mind Frank’s famed 1988 article.  See 
Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988). 
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that jurisdiction)?  As the world’s constitutional landscape has 
changed in the past six decades or so, with the spread of the idea of 
constitution as law (and not merely as pamphlet or declaration), as 
well as the practice of judicial review, whether in its centralized or de-
centralized forms, the choice of jurisdictions has accordingly diversi-
fied.  This debate about selection is familiar, perhaps too much so, in 
the American legal culture in the context of citations to foreign law.3  It 
has been said in that context that where one looks depends partly on 
why one is looking — and what one hopes to find.  But does it?  Must 
selection be purely instrumental?  Or could comparison be different — 
can anything about it change us?  
Furthermore, what is the object of comparison?  Whether one seeks 
to understand constitutional structure, institutional design, or the in-
terpretation of rights, the question will be: where to look?  Constitu-
tional text is important but likely insufficient — and if one needs to 
look beyond it, how far beyond?  Should one consider doctrine, institu-
tional structure, political culture, or historical context?  And when one 
stops, why stop there?  Presumably, a more complete understanding 
requires pushing on — and on one can push, since there is no reason to 
believe that other legal systems or political cultures are less complex 
and intricate than we know our own to be. 
Then comes the problem of translation.  Constitutional systems are 
combinations of contingency and principle so that even when the latter 
sound similar (equality, autonomy), aspects of those principles’ mean-
ings will have been shaped by a community’s unique history.  Can we 
fully understand the struggles of others?  And, if not, how can we 
avoid the dangers of “nominalism”?4  As Bernard Williams wrote in 
the preface to his book on Descartes, even if one could play old music 
on old instruments, one would not be able to hear the music with old 
ears.5  Understanding requires translation and some dimensions of 
constitutional meaning almost always get lost in translation. 
These are all formidable challenges.  And there is more. 
Is the project of constitutional comparison itself legitimate?  That 
depends, of course, on many factors, including who undertakes the 
comparison — scholars, judges, legislators — and when the compari-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 3 See, e.g., Roger Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, 52 UCLA 
L. REV. 639 (2005); Jeremy Waldron, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term — Comment: Foreign Law 
and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L. REV. 129 (2005).  For the larger context of this de-
bate, see generally VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNA-
TIONAL ERA (2010).    
 4 The nominalist fallacy assumes identity of content (for example, the value of privacy) from 
similarity in form (for example, the right to privacy).  This danger is mentioned in Bruce Acker-
man, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771, 794 (1997); and Mark Tushnet, 
The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225 (1999). 
 5 BERNARD WILLIAMS, DESCARTES 9 (1978).   
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son occurs in the life cycle of a constitution.  Challenges to legitimacy 
have been particularly forceful at the interpretative stages.  Constitu-
tions are commonly understood as self-referential systems of secondary 
rules that structure political power and enable processes of self-
determination of a presumably prespecified collective “self.” What 
traction can constitutional practices or ideas have outside the political 
community for which they were first devised? 
Finally, even assuming that the above questions can be answered, 
are the risks of comparison worth taking, particularly in societies that 
are already by and large well-ordered?  If the comparative project is 
taken seriously and done well, if its relevance is not marginal, won’t 
the risk of constitutional destabilization be very high?  The experience 
of traveling can change how we argue law, how we write and think 
about it.  But what if law is what keeps society together?6  The goods 
of social ordering are fragile, and the respect-worthiness of a constitu-
tional system cannot be taken for granted; why risk them?  
Frank’s work makes it possible to answer these questions.  I don’t 
mean that the work itself offers a set of definitive answers — saying 
that wouldn’t do justice to its importance.  Frank does much more 
that just give us answers.  He shows how to go about searching for 
them — what answers looks like.  He teaches us the importance of 
asking the right questions, and the spirit in which to do it: that spirit 
of looking at law’s republics “simply and directly, having only in 
mind our intention of finding out what they really are, not the 
prestige of our great intellectual act of looking at them.”7 Frank’s 
work shows how to learn from the world without losing ourselves in it; 
how to train our minds to travel the world remembering still the home 
we left behind.  Frank shows how to do comparative law as a full ju-
rist and how to be a jurist as a whole human being. 
II.  THE JURISPRUDENCE OF COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
Comparative law was not Frank’s initial intellectual home — yet 
his generous visits have changed the field.  Writing about the state of 
this field, one noted comparative lawyer recently remarked that “the 
business of comparatists is fundamentally no different from the busi-
ness of any other type of legal scholar.  All good legal scholars are in-
terested in carefully working out normative justifications for human 
action and for the exercise of human authority.”8  Unsurprisingly, there 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 6 ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 47 (1976) (“Each society re-
veals through its law the innermost secrets of the manner in which it holds men together.”).  
 7 Lionel Trilling, Introduction to GEORGE ORWELL, HOMAGE TO CATALONIA, at v, xi (1952).  
 8 James Q. Whitman, The neo-Romantic turn, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES 312, 344 
(Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003).  Past abuses of “grand theory” explain why com-
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is continuity between law’s republics, between how one thinks about 
one’s own constitutional system and how one thinks about others’.  
Frank’s approach to the constitutional laws of other peoples shares 
some of the jurisprudential pedigree of his take on the laws of the 
American republic.  They are of one piece.  The project of compara-
tive constitutional law is a part of the project of law, or, to be specific, 
of the project of government by law. 
Frank’s work shows how comparative analysis — for, lest we for-
get, comparative constitutional law is comparative law — is multi-
layered: the doctrinal emphasis of the functionalist marketplace of ide-
as is indefensible without supplementing it with an account of 
constitutional culture, which itself rings hollow unless justified by a 
conception of political morality.  There is an internal push in the ar-
gument — in the comparative argument — that forces the doctrinal 
and cultural constitutional analysis to go up.  Up where? 
Up, perhaps, in the normative cloud that transcends jurisdictional 
boundaries and connects us and them, the self and the world, inside 
and outside.  Up toward “a sense of internal moral commonality and 
ethical fellowship”9 among members of a political community and 
maybe beyond.  Comparative experience helps us see the world, and 
ourselves in it, from the perspective of other peoples — of those people 
we have not become — and unveils dimensions of constitutional iden-
tity that routine and thoughtlessness would otherwise have continued 
to conceal.  Enhanced reflectivity is not just good to have — rather, it 
is an essential part of how citizens shape the social spaces they inhabit.  
Comparative analysis becomes an epistemological and normative tool 
for the jurist who interrogates how the terms of collective life can rein-
force the standing of law’s subjects as its free and equal authors. 
This approach raises intriguing questions.  Praising comparative 
law for enhancing constitutional reflectiveness shows that the compar-
ative experience is helpful, but is it necessary?  Reflectiveness can be 
enhanced in many ways, of which comparison is presumably only one.  
What has the comparative experience added to Frank’s understanding 
of constitutionalism that couldn’t be found in his work already?  Fur-
thermore, does it matter how the comparative experience enhances re-
flectiveness?  Comparative scholars have argued that mistaken under-
standings of foreign law can be fruitful.10  If this is so, why do we 
admire Frank’s scholarship for getting things right?  Finally, how does 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
parative law suffers from a normative deficit.  For a discussion, see William P. Alford, On the 
Limits of “Grand Theory” in Comparative Law, 61 WASH. L. REV. 945 (1986).    
 9 Frank I. Michelman, Integrity-Anxiety?, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 241, 274 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005). 
 10 ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS 99 (1974) (arguing that “foreign law can be influ-
ential even when it is totally misunderstood”).   
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comparative analysis shape one’s understanding of the possibilities of 
constitutional democracy?  I will suggest that their relationship is one 
of reflective equilibrium where changes in each project trigger recali-
brations in the other.  Specifically, in the context of Frank’s work, is 
there a connection between his befriending South Africa and his work 
on constitutional legitimacy, for instance, his (family?) quarrel with 
contractualist11 or “post-metaphysical” approaches to constitutionalism? 
III.  FRAMING THE COMPARATIVE QUESTION 
Constitutional doctrine, culture and political morality are interwo-
ven in Frank’s comparative approach to law’s republics.  To explore 
this approach, let us return to the question: what relevance, if any, do 
the laws of other republics have for how a society orders its political 
affairs in light of pre-established terms as inscribed in a written docu-
ment that has the status of higher law?  Framed at this general level, 
and assuming that the higher law itself does not settle the matter,12 the 
answer is context dependent.  For instance, the reasons for the influ-
ence of American law in nineteenth-century Argentina will be different 
from the reasons why French law has been influential in post-
communist Romania.  History, institutional structure, legal culture or 
culture tout court, accident, and reputational considerations come to 
mind as some of the many relevant factors.  But suppose we further 
specify the question to concern the possible relevance of the constitu-
tional practice of a legal system that finds itself in the early stages of 
development, and whose long term stability depends on its success in 
establishing the legitimacy of its institutions, for a mature constitution-
al system that has developed an intricate web of legal doctrine and 
whose political institutions, including courts, are already established. 
Take, for instance, South Africa and the United States, and consid-
er the possible relevance of contrasting approaches to the permissibility 
of the state’s use of remedial racial classifications.13  In proper compar-
ative fashion, we must first identify differences and similarities be-
tween the two constitutional systems.  In fact, one finds differences 
and similarities at all levels.  At the level of political and historical 
context, similarities of racial hatred and discrimination are painfully 
apparent, as are the differences in terms of the two societies’ majori-
ties/minorities.  At the level of constitutional text, the two constitutions 
are similar in that they include equality provisions and dissimilar in 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 11 See Frank I. Michelman, Is the Constitution a Contract for Legitimacy?, 8 REV. CONST. 
STUD. 101 (2003). 
 12 Sometimes it does.  See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST. ch. 1(c), § 39(1)(c) (1996) (“When interpreting 
the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum . . . may consider foreign law.”). 
 13 See Frank I. Michelman, Reflection, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1737 (2004).    
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their specific, if underdetermined, wording.  At the level of institution-
al structure, both legal systems have a practice of judicial review of 
legislation, even though the respective structures reflect their different 
stages of development.  As to constitutional commitment, the legacies 
of both societies leave no one guessing that the treatment of race plays 
an essential part in their constitutional trajectories.  But the actual 
constitutional expressions of that commitment — and now we are get-
ting closer to the object of the comparison — diverge.  On the one 
hand, American doctrine treats all racial classifications, regardless of 
aim, as acts that are intrinsically wrong and therefore subjects them to 
categorical, side-constraint limitations in the form of strict judicial 
scrutiny.14  By contrast, South African doctrine treats racial discrimina-
tion as a dignitary, rather than an expressive, harm and interprets that 
harm as possibly congruent with race-conscious state action whose 
purpose is remedial.15  There are many wrinkles and nuances to the 
different doctrinal constructs, for example regarding the actual appli-
cation of the categorical rule in the American context and the objective 
versus subjective interpretations of dignitary harm in South African 
law.16  Awareness of the fine print of constitutional doctrine, of the 
dangers of nominalism, and of the interplay of specific provisions with 
the larger structure — what Mark Tushnet calls modularity17 — act as 
cautionary signs for the comparativist.  But suppose the comparativist 
has done the homework.  The question about the relevance of South 
Africa’s doctrine on the validity of race-conscious state action to the 
American interpretation of affirmative action in this context remains.18 
Before proceeding further, it is noteworthy how, from the stand-
point of Frank’s ethics of comparative inquiry, the question of rele-
vance is not one-directional.  The comparative question can be asked 
both ways, about the relevance of each system to the other’s laws.  
The existence of more established constitutional traditions in the Unit-
ed States neither negates nor downplays the possible relevance of 
South Africa’s constitutional experiments to American law.  In this 
sense, the comparative encounter resembles a Habermasian ideal con-
stitutional speech community where raw power gives way to the force 
of the better argument.  But what can the “better” argument mean in 
this context? 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 14 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 15 City Council of Pretoria v. Walker 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 16 Michelman, supra note 13, at 1754–58. 
 17 Mark Tushnet, Returning with Interest: Observations on Some Putative Benefits of Study-
ing Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 325, 331 (1998).  See also generally 
JACKSON, supra note 3.  
 18 See Michelman, supra note 13, at 1759.    
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IV.  CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE: THE MARKETPLACE  
OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 
Suppose the “better” argument is the best answer available on the 
marketplace of constitutional ideas to problems that all or most liberal 
constitutional systems must face.  From this perspective, the laws of 
other republics form a repertoire of solutions to similar legal problems.  
We find here echoes of the functionalist tradition in comparative law 
that sees the migration of legal norms, typically understood as legal 
rules, as answering a need to solve similar problems across jurisdic-
tions.  While initially devised to explain the evolution of private law, 
functionalism applies, mutatis mutandis, to the constitutional realm.19 
Presented as a tool for “solving similar problems”, the shortcomings 
of this approach are apparent.  Solving similar “problems” assumes the 
existence of a problem that needs to be solved.  But why look for solu-
tions abroad if one believes the question has already been answered?  
For instance, if all racial classifications are deemed harmful, why use 
comparative law to revisit the decision to subject them to strict judi-
cial scrutiny?  Furthermore, labeling problems as “similar”, or “com-
mon”, requires a comprehensive framework that connects domestic 
and foreign constitutional experiences.  The historical experiences of 
racial subordination in the United States and South Africa are im-
portant but, without more, arguably insufficient to establish common-
ality for the purpose of the constitutional treatment of racial classifica-
tions.  And without establishing that commonality, which a mere focus 
on the marketplace of ideas does not provide, it is virtually impossible 
to defend the selection, methods and conclusions of comparative work. 
Progress can, however, be made by focusing on how the “solution” 
itself is defined.  If the solution is the same as the outcome itself 
(“Look, South African constitutional law has endorsed the be-
nign/invidious dichotomy”), then that outcome can be dismissed on the 
ground that such an answer was proposed, considered and rejected by 
American constitutional law.20  Unless foreign law is said to have prec-
edential authority, which is not a claim that functionalism makes, then 
the mere existence of different answers somewhere in the constitutional 
world will not matter much.  But if the “solution” is more finely tuned 
as part of the justification of the outcome, for instance as a claim that 
one system’s application of different standards of review to remedial 
and invidious racial classifications does not violate formal equality, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 19 See Vlad Perju, Constitutional Transplants, Borrowing, and Migrations, in OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1304, 1309–13 (Michel Rosenfeld & 
András Sajó eds., forthcoming 2012). 
 20 See generally Frank I. Michelman, Reasonable Umbrage: Race and Constitutional Antidis-
crimination Law in the United States and South Africa, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1378 (2004).   
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and if such a violation was the ground for rejecting the said dichotomy 
in the first place, then the South African interpretation might indeed 
be relevant in solving a common problem.  Indeed, this is Frank’s sub-
tle claim about the relevance of South African equality jurisprudence.21 
One finds in the intricacies of constitutional doctrine the primary 
appeal of functionalism.  It is an intuitive appeal rooted in that, what-
ever else law might be, it is primarily and inescapably a tool for solv-
ing practical problems of social ordering.  As we shall see, constitu-
tional democracies strive to secure a certain type of social ordering, 
one well captured by Rawls as stability for the right reasons.22  But 
however that lofty goal is defined, solving practical problems remains 
essential to the task of delivering social order.  Since constitutional sys-
tems will sometimes experience similar problems of ordering, foreign 
law can have practical relevance as a repertoire of possible solutions.  
Our question about the cross-jurisdictional relevance can be answered 
by digging deep within constitutional doctrine.  Such comparative 
analysis is no doubt demanding since it requires judicial craft as well 
as intimate knowledge of the constitutional systems that form the ob-
ject of comparison.  Frank’s work is an exemplary model for how to 
undergo such analysis.  This is the virtue of functionalism. 
It is also, however, its limitation.  The appeal of functionalism is 
narrow and deep.  It is narrow because, as we have seen, the solution 
is defensible only when defined narrowly.  But a narrow definition 
confines the repository of ideas and accordingly limits the trade in 
comparative law.  This appeal of functionalism is Pyrrhic in another 
way too.  The comparativist needs to dig (too?) deep into other legal 
systems to find answers to questions that set him traveling in the first 
place.  In our example, Frank’s careful doctrinal analysis leads him to 
reconstruct the dynamic of the constitutional argument in South Afri-
can doctrine from discrimination-as-harm through harm-as-
impairment-of-dignity to impairment-as-objective.23  Doctrinal transla-
tion becomes the comparativist’s challenge.  Not only has discrimina-
tion-as-harm been rejected in American law, but the very idea of dig-
nity (not to mention “objective dignity”) has little equivalent in the 
corpus of American constitutional law and even less in the equal pro-
tection jurisprudence.  The more specific the comparative analysis be-
comes, the greater the difficulties of translation given cross-
constitutional differences. 
This is a critical moment in the comparative experience and 
Frank’s work shows us how to overcome it.  Even as careful doctrinal 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 21 See generally Michelman, supra note 13.    
 22 See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1996).   
 23 See generally Michelman, supra note 13.    
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analysis is a staple of his work, Frank Michelman’s overall approach 
to comparative law is not functionalist.  In fact, his vision of compara-
tive law is grander and bolder than what defensible functionalism 
commends.  Comparative work must internalize the virtues of func-
tionalism but ultimately it must — somehow — transcend it.  Func-
tionalism helpfully brings to the forefront the necessities of positive le-
gal ordering but, in that very process, it raises questions that the func-
functionalist framework itself cannot answer. 
The path to overcoming functionalism, after having internalized its 
lessons, becomes clear once we revisit a premise that the above analy-
sis took for granted.  Describing comparative law as a repository of 
constitutional ideas assumes that “novelty” is the takeaway of compar-
ative analysis.  In this view, the comparative approach would be help-
ful to bolster one’s imagination.  But what if one’s constitutional imag-
ination does not need further bolstering?  One finds in Frank’s work 
elements of the critique of the American “fusion” of racial classification 
and maltreatment in scholarship reacting to the fusion’s first doctrinal 
manifestations.  In the context of social and economic interests, 
Frank’s work does not gloss over justiciability concerns in arguing 
that such interests can be protected under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.24  The same is true of his work on the state action doctrine and 
the Constitution’s radiating power into the common law.  If “novelty” 
were all, then comparative law would at most bring added support to 
the work of a scholar who has already looked skeptically from within, 
so to speak, at his republic’s constitutional architecture. 
So, perhaps the relevance of comparison will not be found in the 
novelty of constitutional constructs as much as in their possibility or 
practicality: the road not taken remains somewhere in the horizon of 
constitutional possibility.  The justification of past constitutional choice 
can be revisited in light of the experience of other republics whose 
laws chose that alternative.  This goes beyond the problem-solving ap-
proach of functionalism, for what makes a constitutional choice more 
or less promising is no mere efficiency consideration.  Constitutional 
promise is a matter at the intersection of constitutional doctrine, cul-
ture and, as we shall see, political morality.  The comparative constitu-
tional experiences push, epistemologically and normatively, the horizon 
of constitutional possibility. 
But do all constitutional systems share the same horizon of consti-
tutional possibility?  The larger context — cultural, political, historical 
— has typically been a blind spot of functionalism, yet context does 
shape perceptions of legal possibility.  What is the proper context for 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 24 See generally Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term — Foreword: On Pro-
tecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969). 
  
2012] LAW'S REPUBLICS 213 
comparisons?  Frank’s work speaks wisely and generously to this 
question. 
V.  CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE: ON IMPRESSIONISM  
IN CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
If the legal landscape were populated by rules that could be disen-
thralled at will from their surrounding environment, then comparative 
analysis might perhaps result in pushing the ‘restart’ button and build-
ing the doctrinal edifice afresh.  But alas, reality is more complicated.  
A standard critique of functionalism in comparative law points to the 
cultural meanings of legal norms.  The practical relevance of a foreign 
law is limited by its embeddedness in the broader culture.  That does 
not leave comparative law without any purpose — it just leaves it 
without an immediate, functional purpose.  In this view, the proper 
aim of comparative analysis is not to study how systems change but 
rather to understand why their rootedness makes them unchangeable 
at will. 
At some level, it seems right to point to the role of culture as part 
of law’s complex environment.  Legal doctrines ossify, subsequent doc-
trine builds on, and the behavior, expectations and intuitions of consti-
tutional actors eventually become entrenched.  Using comparative law 
to reverse-engineer constitutional doctrine will be unsuccessful because 
collective self-government through law isn’t an engineering project in 
the first place.  What, then, can be the point of reflecting on the consti-
tutional arrangements of other republics? 
Frank answers, teasingly: “mirror.”25  By reflecting on others, we 
gain a better understanding of ourselves.  The experiences in self-
government of other political communities offer a standpoint from 
which to become more objective, perhaps more lucid, about one’s own 
constitutional system.  Comparative analysis is “dialogical.”26  Dialogue 
with others helps us become aware of how we talk, funny accents and 
all.  It draws our attention to what we say and what we leave unsaid.  
Herta Müller, a novelist who chronicles life under totalitarianism, once 
wrote that a language is what people talk about in that language.27  
Constitutional dialects are probably no different. 
To be sure, we cannot entirely step outside of our culture, just as 
we cannot entirely step outside of our language.  But if there is no Ar-
chimedean standpoint, no place outside from which to look back at 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 25 Michelman, supra note 13, at 1737. 
 26 “Dialogical” is defined as “facilitating a greater understanding of one’s own legal system.”  
Sujit Choudhry, The Lochner Era and Comparative Constitutionalism, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1, 52 
(2004).  Choudhry drew inspiration from Michelman, supra note 2. 
 27 HERTA MÜLLER, THE APPOINTMENT (2001).   
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everything — or at least not at everything at the same time — then the 
challenge becomes how to construct the situated objectivity of the 
comparativist’s standpoint from which to unveil dimensions of the 
constitutional realm that would otherwise remain obscured.  Whether 
they reveal greater complexity or rather help to recover some of law’s 
polyphonic simplicity,28 the comparative perspective enhances constitu-
tional reflectiveness and self-understanding. 
One of the many reasons for celebrating Frank’s works is his de-
scription, from afar looking back, of the American constitutional cul-
ture: the disposition of mind, the shared lifeworld(s) of its participants, 
why the same argument always wins.  Why does the South African 
approach to benign racial classifications not push the horizon of possi-
bility in American constitutional law?  What in American constitu-
tional culture is the source of resisting the dichotomy between invidi-
ous and benign racial classifications?  Frank shows that “American 
jurists treat proposals for a dichotomous doctrine so cautiously.”29  
They perceive racial classifications as “repugnant.”30  But again, why?  
Perhaps this has to do in part with how analytical jurisprudence has 
colonized the political argument in the United States.31  Still, what are 
the origins of this constitutional/cultural phenomenon?  “[A]nti-
classification,” Frank writes, “is a current commitment of American 
constitutional culture.”32  Interestingly, this is a “current” commitment.  
The revulsion against racial classification is not built into the DNA of 
the American Equal Protection Clause.  It must come from some-
where, from a series of interpretative choices that have erased the doc-
trinal and normative residue of an imperfect translation of 
antisubordination into anticlassification.33  Doctrinal deconstruction 
shows how, when those interpretive choices were made, they were just 
that: choices. 
Frank’s approach to constitutional culture is similar to his ap-
proach to constitutional function.  The analysis gives culture its due 
but no more.  For all the centrality of constitutional culture(s), Frank’s 
reader is not subjected to Volksgeist or Völkerpsychologie.  Under-
standing culture is not tantamount to extolling it; the reader does not 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 28 On the latter, see, for example, FRANK I. MICHELMAN, Epilogue, in BRENNAN AND 
DEMOCRACY (1999).  See also, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation De-
cisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960).   
 29 Michelman, supra note 13, at 1741. 
 30 Michelman, supra note 20, at 1383. 
 31 See Frank I. Michaelman, A Constitutional Conversation with Professor Frank Michelman, 
in (1995) S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 477, 481 (1995). 
 32 Michelman, supra note 13, at 1745. 
 33 See generally Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values 
in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004). 
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awaken in the “neo-Romantic jungles.”34  The subtle insights of consti-
tutional culture are internalized and then transcended.  Since culture 
itself is dynamic, doesn’t understanding have any instrumental value?  
Whence the normative push to pursue dialogue with others, to reflect 
lucidly on the cultural dimension of doctrine, to seek understanding?  
In an essay titled “The Loneliness of the Comparative Lawyer,” Pro-
fessor John Henry Merryman noted that “comparative law . . . is not 
really about comparison, at least not very much.”35  What else is it 
about?  Perhaps the answer has to do with a disposition of mind — for 
all the loneliness, one needn’t be fatalistic.  Understanding how and 
what we are, we might dislike it — what if we decide to change?  
There is something subversive about having knowledge and about 
tools like comparative law that help acquiring it.36 
The importance of enhanced reflectiveness takes us back to the 
idea of function, only that this time the focus is at a more general level 
on the function of the constitution itself and of legal ordering more 
generally.  The project of comparative constitutional law is part of the 
project of government by law. 
VI.  CONSTITUTIONAL MORALITY:  
THE COMPARATIVE PROJECT REVISITED 
What is a Constitution?  We are lucky, once again, in our guide.  
Suppose it is, or should be, a “publicly binding statement of the terms 
of a political association that citizens are morally justified in support-
ing, using whatever force those terms permit to secure compliance with 
laws enacted in accordance with them.”37  Suppose the constitution is, 
or should be, “the core of a social pact to keep our political divisions at 
bay and to maintain political co-operation in spite of them.”38  For lib-
erals aware that the goods of social ordering depend on the fact of co-
ercing free and equal persons whose disagreements in matters of jus-
tice can be as deep as they are reasonable, the constitution is — or 
should be — the instrument “suppl[ying], or codif[ying] officially, a 
publicly acknowledged standard for gauging the respect-worthiness of 
government in [a] country.”39 
This is a tall order.  Can constitutions deliver on that promise?  
The provocations on Frank’s contributions to Law and Philosophy 
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 34 Whitman, supra note 8, at 336.   
 35 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE LONELINESS OF THE COMPARATIVE LAWYER 1 
(1999).   
 36 See generally George Fletcher, Comparative Law as a Subversive Discipline, 46 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 683 (1998).   
 37 Michelman, supra note 11, at 103–04. 
 38 Id. at 109. 
 39 Id. at 106–07. 
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take up some of those issues.40  For us, it matters more that we get to 
ask these questions and to understand why we are asking them.  We 
ask because the comparative inquiry has brought us to them.  There is 
something in the argument — in the comparative argument — that 
pushes the argument up, from constitutional doctrine to considerations 
of broader constitutional and political culture to questions of constitu-
tional morality. 
As Frank’s work shows, questions of constitutional morality are 
themselves not entirely detached from the social world as the legal 
rules have already structured it.  In an essay discussing the American 
“anti-conversationalist” stance on the use of foreign law in constitu-
tional interpretation, even as persuasive authority, Frank traced the 
roots of that approach to an anxiety that joining the global conversa-
tion could undermine the objectivity of constitutional discourse and ul-
timately its integrity.41  He acknowledged that changes in the discourse 
might indeed occur.42  But, he argued, such changes would not neces-
sarily erode the integrity of the discourse.  In fact, just the opposite can 
happen.  Openness to the experiences in self-government of other polit-
ical communities can help (re)build the constitution’s promise of objec-
tivity and integrity.  It could, for instance, enable judges to understand 
better the claims that individuals bring forward and answer them in 
ways that recognize and reinforce their social standing.43 
By emphasizing the connections among doctrine, culture, and mo-
rality, Frank Michelman’s work teaches essential lessons about com-
parative constitutional studies.  One lesson is that the project of com-
parative constitutional law is intimately related to the project of 
constitutional law — and of government by law.  That latter project 
places domestic and foreign law within a unitary framework without 
which the comparativist’s choices cannot be defended.  But the nature 
of the framework matters greatly.  A mere continuity between domestic 
and foreign law is by itself insufficient since history is filled with bad 
continuities, so to speak.44  In fact, the project of government by law — 
or, more specifically, of liberal constitutionalism — not only informs 
the comparative enterprise but also is shaped by comparative experi-
ences.  These projects are in a relation of reflective equilibrium where 
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 40 See Robert Post, Provocation: Frank’s Way, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 218 (2012); T.M. Scanlon, 
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changes in each can lead to recalibration in how the other project is 
formulated.  In the context of Frank’s work, this relationship leads to 
important questions.  What can comparative constitutional law teach 
about constitutional contractualism?  What do the constitutional expe-
riences of law’s republics teach about the convergence of individuals’ 
“common human reason” on judgments about the respect-worthiness 
of a constitutional system?  Does it matter, from the standpoint of con-
stitutional legitimacy, whether constitutional objectivity is grounded 
solely in a form of discourse or in a shared substantive vision of the 
values of the Constitution? 
These are only some of the many questions to be answered, and it 
is perhaps fitting to conclude on this dialogical note.  Asking the right 
questions is one of the great many lessons to learn from Frank 
Michelman’s extraordinary body of work.  On how we answer them 
depends the future of comparative constitutional law as well as our 
journey ahead.  And what a journey this is. 
